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Abstract
This article examines why Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in 2001 turned 
down a proposal for an EU take-over directive? The first explanation focuses on party 
ideology. However, MEPs overwhelmingly voted according to national rather than party 
lines. Two additional explanations emphasise national characteristics: labour market 
legislation (national schemes to protect employees against dismissals) and corporate 
governance issues. Labour market legislation can explain the UK and German MEP votes 
but not the Swedish and French MEPs votes. These votes can be explained by 
emphasising measures against take-overs such as a high level of market capitalisation and 
unequal voting rights.
1 I thank Michel Goyer for suggesting the idea for this paper and for letting me use tables 7 and 8 from his 
own work. I also thank Jaap Winter, Jonathan Rickford and anonymous Commission officials for useful 
information.
2INTRODUCTION
In March 2000, the European Council in Lisbon set out a ten-year strategy to make the 
EU the world's most dynamic and competitive economy. The hope is that the strategy 
will lead to a stronger economy. Behind the lofty rhetoric is an important fact: although 
the 1957 Treaty of Rome set out to create a single market in goods, services, capital and 
people, Europe maintains a wide range of barriers to a single market. DG Internal Market 
has carried out several studies, which show that economic gains could be had if more 
reforms were undertaken in financial services for example. This article examines some of 
the obstacles to the creation of a single market in financial services by looking at the
attempt to create a common take -over directive in the EU.
The European Commission in its 1985 White Paper on completing the internal 
market proposed the adoption of a take-over directive to create a legal framework for 
consistent take -over rules across the EU. Such a directive was intended as part of a 
broader program of financial market integration. Subsequently the Commission on 19 
January 1989 presented to the Council of Ministers a proposal for a law concerning take-
over bids. After a long and difficult political process the proposal was struck down in the 
European Parliament on 4 July 2001 in a historic vote, which was tied 273-2732. This 
article examines why the EU has found it so difficult to agree on a take -over directive and 
focuses in particular on the vote in the European Parliament on 4 July 20013.
Specifically, this article asks why a significant number of continental European countries 
2 When a vote is tied in the third and final vote in the European Parliament the proposal is turned down.
3 As a result of the European Parliament’s rejection o f the proposal in the third and final vote the 
Commission had to draft a fresh legislative proposal. In October 2002 the Commission presented its new 
proposal.
3including France and the UK voted in favour of the take -over directive? And furthermore, 
this article asks why Germany changed its position from support to opposition? At first 
German Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and the German government were 
actively involved in drafting a common European take -over code. However, eventually 
German MEPs changed their minds and strongly opposed the directive in the crucial 
2001 vote. 
We examine three different explanations for the outcome and focus in particular 
on the votes by UK, German and French MEPs. A brief discussion of Sweden is also 
included. The first expla nation examines the impact of political ideology. Typically 
MEPs vote according to political party affiliation (Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and Gérard 
Roland, 2002). However, in the case of the take -over directive MEPs voted according to 
country affiliation rather than party affiliation. For example German MEPs 
overwhelmingly voted against the directive while UK MEPS voted in favour of the 
directive. We therefore turn to two explanations that focus on national institutional 
characteristics as determinants of the voting pattern. One such explanation examines the 
impact of national labour market institutions, in particular the strictness of protection 
against dismissals. A second explanation explores the impact of national models of 
corporate governance. 
Labour market institutions are important because at least in the short run take -
overs often lead to redundancies. The take-over wave in the US in the 1980s illustrated 
this. We therefore expect that countries with flexible labour laws (indicated in particular 
by low barriers to dismissal) would be more likely to vote for the directive because these 
countries are expected to take advantage of the greater possibility for take-overs than 
4countries with inflexible labour laws. We find that this prediction fits the UK which has 
flexible labour laws and whose MEPs supported the take-over code. Germany also fits 
the prediction with its rigid labour laws and German MEP opposition to the directive. 
However, while this explanation might account for the UK and German MEP votes it
cannot account for the voting patterns of French and Swedish MEPs. In spite of inflexible 
labour laws in Sweden and France, MEPs from both countries overwhelmingly supported 
the take-over directive.
Next, in order to explain the disagreement in the European Parliament we turn to 
national models of corporate governance. We expect that countries characterized by a 
continental corporate governance model such as Germany, France and Sweden will not 
favour a take-over directive while liberal market economies such as the UK might find a 
take-over directive to be compatible with their institutional structures. The reason is that 
the directive increases the importance of the market for corporate control, which is in line 
with the UK model of corporate governance rather than the continental model. This 
simple view of national corporate governance models cannot account for the French (and 
Swedish) MEP voting patterns. Instead we look to specific national barriers against take-
overs. If an EU member state possesses barriers that shelter it from hostile take-overs and 
the proposed directive does not remove these barriers, then MEPs from this member state 
might not oppose the directive.
The article is divided into five parts. Part I briefly describes the political history of 
the take-over directive. Part II examines the role of ideology while part III focuses on the 
impact of labour market institutions. Part IV constitutes the core of the argument and 
5stresses the role of divergent corporate governance traditions. Finally, part V presents our 
conclusions.
I THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE TAKE-OVER DIRECTIVE
The European Commission views a take -over directive as a crucial step towards the 
integration of European capital markets. According to the Commission, the objectives of
the directive are threefold: 
First, it is to draw up fair common rules for take-over bids in the EU for all interested 
parties (companies, shareholders and stakeholders, including employees of the 
companies concerned). Second, to offer companies increased legal certainty and as 
“level a playing field” as possible when operating in several Member States. Third, 
to provide proper protection to minority shareholders in the case of a change of 
control (speech by Commissioner Bolkestein held at the Centre for European Policy 
Studies, 4 March, 2003).
1.1 The Initial Process
On 19 January 1989 the Commission presented to the Council of Ministers a proposal 
for a “Thirteenth Council Directive on company law concerning take -over and other 
general bids”. On 10 September 1990 the Commission adopted an amended proposal 
that took account of the opinions of the Economic and Social Committee and the 
European Parliament. However, the UK feared that the shift toward a legislative 
system would create problems for its active take-over market by “… introducing 
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hand, Germany objected to encouraging take-overs because it favoured its own 
stakeholder system. The Commission subsequently sent out questionnaires to member 
states asking them to identify issues of importance. Finally, the Commission on 8 
February 1996 presented a framework proposal. The European Parliament endorsed 
the proposal but suggested amendments, which were incorporated by the Commission 
at the end of 1997. 
71.2 A Change in the German Position
In October 1998 the Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder became the new German 
Chancellor. Schröder strongly favoured the take-over directive, which he saw as 
supporting his 1998 Corporate Sector Supervision and Transparency Act (KonTraG)4.
According to Hoepner, “[B]esides some limited modifications to supervisory board 
regulation, risk management and bank ownership of industrial capital, this capital-
market-oriented law legalized share buybacks, facilitated the introduction of stock 
options and, above all, abolished unequal voting rights … [I]n its commentary on the 
law the Federal Ministry of Justice took the historical step of abolishing the 
stakeholder view of the firm (which had been written down in the Stock Corporation 
Act of 1937 and approved by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1979) and of 
introducing a shareholder-oriented view…” (Hoepner, 2002, p 13). The Social 
Democrats wanted to prohibit the industrial stock ownership of banks, and saw the 
development of the capital market as important goals. 
Furthermore, in the context of the 2000 Tax Reduction Act the Schröder 
government opted for the total abolition of corporate income tax. The new Tax 
Reduction Act meant that capital gains tax on sales of large corporate shareholdings 
had been removed. The intention according to Hoepner was “… explicitly to abolish 
interlocking capital and as a consequence to change the corporate governance 
mechanisms and to create a more open market for corporate control” (Hoepner, 2002, 
p 16). This intention was in line with the European Commission’s plans. In the 
summer 2000 the Council of Ministers reached an agreement on the directive and sent 
the text to the European Parliament for a second reading. However, surprisingly 
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Lehne, a German right-of-centre Christian Democrat had been appointed rapporteur 
for the take-over directive by the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs
and the Internal Market. Lehne was opposed to many of the directive’s key provisions 
and managed to play a leading role in the discussions of the directive. In fact, Lehne 
was seen as instrumental in ensuring that most German MEPs voted against the 
directive.
Two developments had occurred in Germany in 2000 that played a major role for 
the change in the positions of German MEPs. First, in February 2000 the British 
telecommunications company Vodafone acquired the German mobile phone company 
Mannesmann in a hostile take-over. Second, later in the year American Ford Motor 
Company indicated an interest in acquiring the German car manufacturer VW. Many 
Germans began to worry that prime German companies would be taken over by 
foreign firms. 
Lehne’s main argument against the directive was that it did not ensure a level 
playing field, in particular because the directive did not remove golden shares. A 
golden share is a share owned by the government and vested with sufficient voting 
rights to maintain control and thus fend off potential predators. German firms do not 
have golden shares except VW5 whereas golden shares exist in several EU member 
states such as France´s Société Nationale Elf-Aquitaine. Countries such as France 
permitted the holding by their respective governments of golden shares, which 
4 Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich.
5 Germany limits individual ownership in VW to 20 % thus rendering it immune to any hostile takeover. 
Lower Saxony also owns an 18.6 % stake in the company.
9conferred special rights on them. The perceived threat in Germany of an increase in 
hostile take -overs following the take-over of Mannesmann and the possibility of VW 
being taken over by a US auto manufacturer led to Schröder’s change of heart. 
Schröder told a workers' gathering at a VW plant in Lower Saxony that, "any efforts 
by the Commission in Brussels to smash the VW culture will meet the resistance of 
the federal government as long as we are in power" (Handelsblatt, 27 February 2001). 
Schröder’s position was somewhat ironic because Germany argued strongly against 
golden shares yet fought hard to justify the existence of golden shares in VW.
1.3 Conciliation
In December 2000 the European Parliament had proposed a number of amendments, 
which did not meet with the Council’s approval. If the Council of Ministers does not 
approve the amendments which the European Parliament has adopted at its second 
reading the proposal is subsequently submitted to a Conciliation Committee. This 
committee is made up of the fifteen members of the Council of Ministers or their 
representatives and an equal number of representatives from the European 
Parliament. The political groups appoint the 15 members of the European Parliament 
delegation so that the delegation reflects the overall political balance in the European 
Parliament. The Conciliation Committee reached an agreement on 6 June 2001. 
Within a period of 6-8 weeks the agreement had to be submitted to the Presidents of 
the European Parliament and Council delegations for approval by the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers without any possibility of amendment. On 4 
July 2001 the European Parliament rejected the joint text in its third reading. 273 
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MEPs voted for the proposal and 273 MEPs voted against. When a vote is unanimous 
a proposal falls.
MEPs stressed three major problems with the directive. First, many MEPs 
rejected the principle whereby in order to take defensive measures in the face of a bid, 
the board of the offeree company must first obtain the approval of shareholders once 
the bid has been made (Article 9). Secondly, many MEPs found that the protection, 
which the directive would afford employees of companies involved in a take -over
bid, was insufficient. Finally, many MEPs argued that the proposal failed to achieve a 
level playing field with the US and between EU member states (Article 11).
Need sections on the UK and French positions (to be finalized)
II IDEOLOGY
Political scientists have shown than in most cases in the European Parliament, MEPs vote 
according to party affiliation (Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and Gérard Roland, 2002). 
However, concerning the take -over directive MEPs voted according to their country 
affiliation and not according to their party affiliation. According to Hix, Noury and 
Roland, “coalition formation in all five European Parliaments takes place along the left-
right dimension. The only exception to this left-right pattern of coalition behaviour are 
the Gaullists (and their allies), who have tended to vote more with the Radical Left, at the 
opposite end of the left-right dimension, than with the Green or Socialists. This can be 
explained by the second dimension of conflict found in the European Parliament, namely 
the pro/anti-Europe dimension” (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2002, p 29). Gaullists are likely 
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to take an anti-Europe view. Gaullists see the proposal as posing a threat to national 
models of capitalism in order to strengthen European Union liberalisation policies.
In our case, however, it is clear that country affiliation and not party affiliation is 
the main determinant for how MEPs voted. For example 73 out of 79 UK MEPs voted in 
favour of the directive (92percent). In contrast 95 out of 97 German MEPs (98percent) 
voted against the directive. In the case of France the picture is a little less clear. However, 
46 of 72 MEPs voted in favour of the directive (64percent). Finally, all Swedish MEPs 
voted in favour of the directive.
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Table 1
MEPs who voted “No” to the take-over directive divided into country and party 
affiliation6
EDD GUE/NGL PPE-
DE
PSE TDI Verts/Ale
Austria 6 7 1 14
Belgium 6 5 1 5 16
Denmark 0
Finland 1 1
France 9 4 4 9 26
Germany 5 51 34 5 95
Greece 6 8 7 21
Ireland 1 1 2
Italy 4 30 3 37
Luxembourg 1 1
Netherlands 3 1 9 5 4 22
Portugal 1 1
Spain 4 4 22 1 31
Sweden 0
United
Kingdom
2 4 6
6 EDD: Eurosceptic Group of Parliamentarians
GUE/NGL: Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left
PPE-DE: Chris tian Democrats and European Democrats
PSE: party of European Socialists
TDI: Technical Group of Independent Members
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Table 2
MEPs who voted “Yes” to the take-over directive divided into country and party 
affiliation
YES EDD ELDR GUE/NGL NI PPE-
DE
PSE UEN TDI Verts/Ale
Austria 3 3
Belgium 5 5
Denmark 3 5 1 3 1 13
Finland 4 3 3 10
France 6 5 15 16 3 1 46
Germany 1 1 2
Greece 1 1 2
Ireland 1 4 1 4 10
Italy 4 1 2 12 6 7 32
Luxembourg 1 2 2 5
Netherlands 8 1 9
Portugal 9 8 2 18
Spain 3 20 3 26
Sweden 4 7 6 2 19
UK 10 34 27 2 73
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In the “no” category as shown in table 1 we find Germany as well as Austria, 
Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and partly Italy and Spain. In the “yes” category as 
shown in table 2 we find countries such as the UK, France and Sweden as well as 
Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal. 
Table 3 lists the countries where the majority (defined here as 50percent or more 
of the MEPs) voted in favour of the directive. Table 4 lists the countries where the 
majority (defined as 60percent or more of the MEPs) voted against the directive.
Table 3: 50 percent or more MEP voted yes to the take-over directive:
Country Yes/no votes percentage yes
Denmark 13/0 100
Finland 10/1 90
France 46/26 64
Ireland 10/2 83
Luxembourg 5/1 83
Portugal 18/1 95
Sweden 19/0 100
United
Kingdom
73/6 92
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Table 4: 50 percent or more MEPs voted no to the take-over directive
Country Yes/no votes percentage yes
Austria 14/3 82
Belgium 16/5 76
Germany 95/2 98
Greece 21/2 91
Italy 37/32 53
Netherlands 22/9 71
Spain 31/26 54
But if country specific reasons rather than party ideology seem to account for the voting 
pattern what might these country specific reasons be?7 Next, we examine if labour market 
flexibility might be a determinant of MEP positions on the take-over directive.
III LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY
We expect that countries with flexible labour market regulations (indicated in particular
by low barriers to dismissal) would be more likely to vote for the directive than those 
with rigid labour market regulations (indicated by high barriers to dismissal). The 
experience from the intensive merger activity in the US in the 1980s showed that mergers 
lead to dismissals. Since the take-over directive is expected to encourage merger activity 
we expect the directive to increase the risk of dismissals. We expect that countries with 
7 Explain that party line split can explain some of the votes in France (and possibly Italy and Spain as well)
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rigid labour laws are particularly wary of dismissals and hence MEPs from these 
countries are not expected to support the take -over directive.
In order to evaluate this hypothesis we examine OECD data concerning 
employment protection and labour market performance. As a rough indicator we use the 
OECD’s indicators for “difficulty of dismissal” from the late 1990s (table 2.2 p 57 in 
“Employment Protection and Labour Market Performance”, 1999). The summary score 
can range from 0 to 6, with higher values representing stricter regulation. Their 
calculation is explained in the OECD Annex 2.B).
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Table 5
A ranking of countries based on the difficulty of dismissal
Country Difficulty of dismissal 
(average value: 2.9)
Portugal 4.5
Italy 4.0
Sweden 3.8
Germany 3.5
Greece 3.3
Austria 3.3
The Netherlands 3.3
Spain 3.3
France 2.8
Denmark 2.3
Finland 2.3
Ireland 2.0
Belgium 1.8
UK 0.3
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Table 6
A ranking of countries based on the overall strictness of protection against dismissals
Country Overall strictness of 
protection against 
dismissals (average value: 
2,4)
Portugal 4.3
The Netherlands 3.1
Italy 2.8
Sweden 2.8
Germany 2.8
Spain 2.6
Austria 2.6
Greece 2.4
France 2.3
Finland 2.1
Ireland 1.6
Denmark 1.6
Belgium 1.5
UK 0.8
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Certainly the UK and Germany fit the expectation. As shown in table 5, Germany’s 
score for difficulty of dismissal is 3.5, which is 0.6 higher than the average value. The 
UK’s score is 0.3, which is 2.4 below the average value. Similarly according to table 
6, Germany’s score for strictness of protection against dismissal is 2.8, which is 0.4 
higher than the average value while the UK’s score is 0.8, which is 1.6 below the 
average value. Thus, Germany has strict regulations and German MEPs oppose the 
directive, as we should expect while the UK has lax regulations and UK MEPs favour 
the directive as we should expect. However, not all countries fit this prediction. It is 
even harder to dismiss workers in Sweden compared to Germany according to table 5. 
Furthermore, according to table 6, Sweden’s score on the strictness of protection 
against dismissal is the same as Germany’s but all Swedish MEPs voted for the 
directive.  Furthermore, a majority of French MEPs voted in favour of the directive 
although French labour market regulations are not particularly lax but average. 
According to table 5, the average value of difficulty of dismissal is 2.9 while the 
French value is almost similar at 2.8. According to table 6 the average value of 
strictness of protection against dismissal is 2.4 and the French value is 2.3
In conclusion, while labour market flexibility for some countries is correlated 
with support for the take-over directive and labour market rigidity with opposition to 
the directive, this correlation does not hold true for all countries. In short, the 
prediction does not fit the voting pattern of French (and Swedish) MEPs.
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IV CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The third explanation examined in this paper stresses the importance of the characteristics 
of national systems of corporate governance as a driver behind the voting result in the 
European Parliament.  We examine the impact of national institutional features of 
corporate governance on the voting patterns by MEPs from France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom. In particular, we focus on 1) the evolution of market capitalisation as a 
percentage of GDP and 2) the impact of voting rights.
4.1 The Traditional View of Corporate Governance
Two competing systems of corporate governance have long been seen to exist in Europe 
(see Coffee 1999; LaPorta et al. 2000; Roe 2000; Sheifler and Vishny 1997 for reviews).
First, the British model of corporate governance is characterized by a diffuse ownership 
structure, mutual and pension funds as major shareholders, high financial transparency, 
active securities markets, and the importance of the market for corporate control.
Secondly, the continental European model of corporate governance has traditionally been 
associated with a concentrated ownership structure, banks and non-financial firms as key 
shareholders, low financial transparency, underdeveloped securities marke ts, and the 
absence of hostile take -overs. A crude analysis might predict that harmonization of EU 
take-over law might be supported by MEPs from the United Kingdom (and possibly 
Ireland) and opposed by MEPs from continental Europe because the take-over directive
enhances the importance of market forces. 
According to such a crude analysis, the UK supported the take -over directive for 
three reasons: 1) UK companies have the highest market capitalisation in Europe. Market 
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capitalisation is the market price of a company, calculated by multiplying the number of 
shares outstanding by the price per share. A high market capitalisation would be a crucial
advantage in the merger and acquisitions market, especially if payment is in the form of 
an equity swap. As a result, UK companies stood to gain the most from a common take -
over directive; 2) The UK would like the rest of Europe to be open to take -over bids from 
UK companies since the UK is itself an open market. A take-over directive would likely 
serve to create a more level playing field; 3) The biggest shareholders in the UK are 
institutional investors. Since take-overs are a device to keep a tight check on management
then mutual and pension funds favour take-overs. In contrast, the continental model of 
corporate governance predicts that Germany and France would NOT favour a take-over
directive because market capitalisation is lower in these two countries than in the UK. 
Furthermore, French and German markets have traditionally been closed off to 
competition in orde r to protect domestic values such as employee representation on 
company boards, etc.
4.2 Rethinking The Traditional View of Corporate Governance
However, at least one argument puts serious doubts on this somewhat crude analysis 
about an Anglo-Saxon model and a continental model of corporate governance. The 
relative unimportance of (hostile) take-overs within a country does not imply that 
domestic companies are not interested in proceeding to mergers and acquisitions abroad 
(Kummerle 1999)8. Firms can typically desire to acquire foreign firms as part of a 
strategy to get greater market proximity.  Moreover, take -overs increasingly serve as a 
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device for companies to get access to complementary types of technologies, thereby 
improving their innovative capabilities (Serapio and Dalton 2000).  Firms engage 
themselves in a process of institutional arbitrage whereby they acquire companies in 
countries whose national systems of corporate governance sustain different types of 
innovative capabilities than those found at home (Hall and Soskice 2001: 57).  Finally, 
take-overs constitute the privileged option for firms in building their innovative 
capabilities if their current situation is characterized by technological backwardness 
(Simonin 1997).  In short, firms originating in a continental system of corporate 
governance such as Sweden and France might favour a take -over directive as a means to 
obtaining easier access to a market as well as to complementary types of technology and 
to building innovative facilities. 
4.3 Market Capitalisation and Voting Rules
The argument presented in this paper derives the preferences of MEPs from two factors.
First, we argue that support for a more liberal take-over market in Europe is intimately 
linked to the level of market capitalisation of domestic firms. The issue of market 
capitalisation is an important theme in the corporate governance and strategic 
management literatures. It is likely that the extent of market capitalisation is a major 
determining factor for management views on take-overs, which we assume, are reflected 
in the preferences of MEPs. A high market capitalisation level constitutes an advantage 
for undertaking mergers and acquisitions, especially if companies use equity swaps as 
their means of payment. A high market capitalisation for companies entails that 
8 A growing body of literature in political science illustrates the problem of tracing back the process of 
preference formation. In this paper we simply state that the characteristics of domestic companies are 
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companies would have an easier task proceeding to acquisitions, particularly via equity 
swaps (Coffee 1999: 649; Hoepner 2003).  Moreover, a high level of stock market 
capitalisation implies that the degree of vulnerability from being the recipient of a take -
over bid is reduced.
Secondly, we examine the impact of voting rules. Support for a more liberal take-
over code in Europe can also result from the presence of take-over barriers.  Unequal 
voting rights and other types of deviations from the one share-one vote principle 
contribute to lower the degree of vulnerability of companies from being the recipient of 
unwanted take-over bids. Furthermore, firms with unequal voting rights but with low 
market capitalisation would be at a comparative disadvantage in the global market for 
mergers and acquisitions but they would not have to worry about being the victim of an 
unwanted take-over bid. Data on these two indicators -- market capitalisation and voting 
rules-- for France, the UK and Germany are presented in tables 7 and 8.
First, the high stock market capitalisation of British and French companies 
implies that domestic companies are more likely to be active in the merger and 
acquisition marketplace.  For French firms, however, the excellent performance of their 
share price is a recent phenomenon. As recently as the mid 1990s data on stock market 
capitalisation illustrated relative similarities between France and Germany. Most German 
companies, on the other hand, are unlikely to be able to use equity swap as a means for 
acquisitions.  The relatively low level of overall stock market capitalisation entails that 
only a limited number of firms will be able to use equity swaps as a means to acquire 
other companies.
reflected in the voting patterns of MEP (see Frieden, 1999).
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Second, unequal voting rights and other deviations from the one share-one vote 
principle are more prevalent in France than in either Germany or the United Kingdom 
(see Table 8). French firms can rely on exceptions to one-share one vote voting rights as 
a form of protection from unwanted take -over bids -- in addition to their high level of 
stock market capitalisation. German companies, in contrast, currently face the exact 
opposite situation: low market capitalisation and absence of deviations from the one 
share-one vote principle 9.  However, it is important to note that these changes are recent.
As recently as 1996, over 1/3 of the largest 100 German companies had unequal voting 
rights (Goyer, 2003b).  The 1998 KonTraG abolished unequal voting rights as previously 
discussed. By contrast, less than one -fifth of the 100 largest French companies had 
unequal voting rights or ownership ceilings in 1990 (Goyer, 2003b).
In short whereas a focus on ideology or labour market flexibility could not 
account for the voting pattern by French MEPs, a corporate governance perspective adds 
a piece to the puzzle. French firms have both a high level of market capitalisation and 
extensive take-over barriers. A high level of market capitalisation is consistent with 
French support for the proposal. Furthermore, the directive did not contain a change in 
voting rules, which could affect French firms. French MEP support for the directive fits 
our argument. 
9 It must also be noted that these two indicators of voting preference of MEPs – the level of stock market 
capitalisation and the presence of voting rights that deviate from the one share-one vote principle – can also 
be extended beyond the cases of France, Germany, Sweden and the UK. Several countries (Finland, 
Netherlands) possess a high ratio of stock market capitalisation over GDP. Moreover, the voting rights in 
most continental European countries -- with the notable exception of Germany -- deviates from the one 
share-one vote principle (see the various contributions in Barca and Becht, 2001). 
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Our argument also fits the German position on the take-over directive proposal in 
2001. Germany voted against the directive, which is what we would expect, because 
Germany has a low level of market capitalisation and an absence of take-over barriers.
Finally, take-over barriers are largely absent in the UK. However, although we 
expect an absence of take-over barriers to be correlated with a negative view of a 
directive proposal that does not contain a removal of derogations from the one-share one-
vote rule, British MEPs overwhelmingly voted in favour of the directive10. However, the 
UK has a higher level of market capitalisation than France and Germany, which could 
result in British firms standing to gain substantially from a common European take-over
code. In sum, the UK’s high market capitalisation can explain the UK’s support for the 
directive.
10 The UK does have golden shares in certain companies such as Airport authority. Such shares have been 
ruled unlawful by the ECJ (except when justified by national security concerns).
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Table 7
Evolution of Market Capitalisation as percent of GDP,
(1980-2001)
1980 1985  1990   1994   1996 1998   2000 2001 2002
**
  FRANCE 8 15 26 34 38 105* 112 103 72
GERMANY
9 29 22 24 28 51 68       61       39
  ITALY 6 14 14 18 21 48 72
  JAPAN 36 71 99 77 66 64    102*
SPAIN 8 12 23 25 33 72 90
UNITED
KINGDOM
37 77 87 114 142 167 185 166
UNITED
STATES
48 57 56 75 114 157    181* 152
 Source: European Commission 2002: 31; OECD (1999): 18. 
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*Figures are for 1999.
**Figures are from 1. July 2002.
                                                                           Table 8
Voting Rights (1996 & 2000)
Exception to one -share,
one-vote
France
Top 120
96 – 00
Germany
Top 120
96 – 00
UK
Top 250
96 - 00
United
States
96 – 00
percent of firms with voting 
rights or ownership ceilings
20 – 22 3 – 2 1 – 1 0 – 0
percent of firms with unequal 
voting rights
32 – 68 3 – 3 7 – 0 12 – 13
                                                                    Source: Goyer 
2003a
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4.4 Update and a Focus on Unequal Voting Rights: A Scandinavian Perspective
After the Commission’s draft proposal had been rejected in the European Parliament it 
was submitted to a so-called High-Level Group of Company Law Experts headed by Jaap 
Winter with a mandate to address outstanding issues11. The group submitted its 
recommendations in January 2002. Among the most controversial was a suggestion to 
fully abolish multiple voting rules. On October 2, 2002 the European Commission then 
adopted a new take-over directive proposal. Some aspects of the new proposal were 
similar to the old proposal and in particular the controversial Article 9 had been 
maintained. The Commission considered it a key principle that owners and not managers 
should decide the future of the company (speech by Frits Bolkestein 4th March 2002). 
The new proposal also contained a provision recalling the general legislation applicable 
to protect the rights of employees in the case of company restructuring. However, the 
level playing field issue was the most contentious issue and in particular the proposed 
Break-Through rule. The Commission would have liked to abolish multiple voting rights 
but found that such a proposal would meet too much opposition (speech by 
Commissioner Bolkestein, 4 March 2003 at the Centre for European Policy Studies). 
Instead the Commission proposed the Break-Through rule which means that once a 
bidder successfully reaches a threshold of shares in accordance with national company 
law then the structural defens ive devices mentioned above could be annulled by the new 
majority shareholder. 
The take-over proposal was tabled in the Council of Ministers 3 March 2003 and 
Bolkestein reiterated on 4 March 2003 that the directive has always been considered 
11 The additional members of The High Level Group of Company Law Experts were Jonathan Rickford,
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an essential step towards the integration of European capital markets mandated for 
2005.
In short, the proposal does not do away with voting rights which shareholders 
have negotiated and which are enshrined in different classes of shares such as 
proposed by the Winter group but focuses only on restrictions: if a bidder is 
successful at reaching a threshold of shares in accordance with national company law, 
the structural defensive devices such as voting rights can be annulled by the new 
majority shareholder. It means that if successful the bidder may call a general meeting 
to change the articles of association and the board in accordance with national 
company law12.
The Greek Presidency presented a new proposal on 16 April 2003. According to 
this proposal, all voting ba rriers to take-overs will fall if a public bid has been made 
for 75percent of the firm according to the so-called Break-Through Rule. The 
proposal met extensive opposition in Sweden and Denmark because of the prevalence 
of the A and B share system in these countries (Bob Sherwood, “The European take -
over directive ‘will deter bid activity’, Financial Times, 20 December 2002, national 
news, p 2). At the time of writing (June 1, 2003) the Council of Minister has decided 
to deter a vote on the Break-Through Rule until further investigations have been 
undertaken concerning the possible implications of such a rule.
José Maria Garrido Garcia, Klaus J. Hopt, Guido Rossi, Jan Christensen and Joëlle Simon.
12 In January 2003 Romano Prodi, European Commission President, accused member states of 
backtracking on their promises to liberalize their economies. The worst offenders were said to be 
Germany, France and Italy. According to the Financial Times, “even relatively modest proposals such 
as the creation of a common EU patent or agreeing an EU takeover directive has become bogged down 
in national disagreement” (George Parker, “EU’s big three promise to push reforms”, Financial Times ,
February 6, 2003, Europe, page 8). 
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The 2001 proposal did not contain a provision to abolish unequal voting rights. However, 
the new take-over proposal, which Commissioner Bolkestein presented in October 2002 
proposed a breakthrough rule (Article 11). This proposed change caused Swedish and 
Danish MEPs to change their views on the take -over directive. While Swedish and 
Danish MEPs strongly endorsed the take-over directive in the July 2001 vote in the 
European Parliament the situation was very different when a revised take-over proposal 
was presented under the Greek Presidency. Swedish and Danish MEPs as well as major 
corporations, politicians and lobby organizations from these two countries adamantly 
oppose the new take-over proposal. Sweden possesses a high ratio of stock market 
capitalisation over GDP. However, more importantly family foundations, whose shares 
are divided into A and B shares, own many of the largest companies in Sweden and
Denmark. For example Novo Nordisk, a Danish pharmaceutical company has a share 
capital of DKK 709,388,320 (EURO 100,000,000), which is divided into an A share 
capital of nominally DKK 107,487,200 and a B share capital of nominally DKK 
601,901,120. Novo Nordisk’s A shares are non-listed shares and held by Novo A/S, a 
private limited Danish company, which is 100 percent owned by the Novo Nordisk 
foundation. The B shares are traded in units of DKK 2. The ratio of Novo Nordisk B 
shares to A shares is 1:1. Each holding of DKK 2 of A share capital carries ten times as 
many votes as each holding of DKK 2 of B share capital. Each A-share carries 20 votes, 
whereas each B-share carries 2 votes. The proposed Break-Through Rule could abolish 
this system.
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In the spring 2003 Swedish and Danish MEPs, large businesses with A and B 
shares and unions began to lobby hard against the directive. They argued that the A and B 
share system allowed companies to retain a long-term outlook, and to protect jobs, 
technological expertise as well as certain values such as the triple bottom line accounting 
method. The Swedish government even declared that a take -over directive, which 
abolished the A and B share system might negatively affect the Swedish referendum on 
the Euro scheduled in 2003. Media coverage on the issue in Denmark and Sweden was 
massive and when agreement failed to emerge in the Council of Ministers on 19 May 
2003, Danish and Swedish MEPs expressed relief. In short, protection against take-overs
in the form of voting rules is a main determinant of MEP positions on the take-over
directive.
V CONCLUSION
Features of national systems of corporate governance account to a large extent for the 
way UK, German and French MEPs voted on the take-over directive in July 2001. These 
features include protection of continental European companies from unwanted take-over
bids in the form of unequal voting rights and protection in the form of an increasing level 
of stock market capitalisation. When these aspects of corporate governance are included
in the analysis we have to broaden our categories beyond the traditional liberal market 
economies such as in the UK and the continental market economies such as in Germany 
in order to explain the French (and Swedish) MEP voting pattern.
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